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true renvoi situation,34 since an express stipulation, in the final analysis, presents
a problem of determining the intent of the parties rather than a question of
application of a judicial policy. The court's failure to discuss either this problem
or that of the meaning of a stipulation of the law to be applied indicates a re-
grettable insensitivity to critical conflict of laws issues.
CONFLICT OF LAWS PROBLEMS IN MULTI-STATE LIBEL
A Columbia University professor brought a libel action against the pub-
lishers of Life magazine in the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, alleging that the defendant had printed an article associating
him with certain people indicted "for fascist activities." Life magazine is cir-
culated throughout the United States and in most other civilized countries.
Several suits instituted by the plaintiff in other jurisdictions had been unsuc-
cessful, apparently because of the local statutes of limitation. The district court
in the present case held that the single cause of action which existed was barred
by the Pennsylvania statute of limitations. Upon appeal to the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, the decision was affirmed in part and reversed in part. x
Pennsylvania law provides that when a cause of action is barred by the
statute of limitations of the "state or country in which it arose, such bar shall
be a complete defense to an action thereon .... ." in Pennsylvania.2 In deciding
when and where the cause of action "arose," the circuit court determined that
Pennsylvania regards the printing and distribution of all copies of each issue of
a periodical having nation-wide circulation as but a single "publication"3 and
as giving rise to but one cause of action for libel.4 The court concluded that this
"single" cause of action "arose" in Illinois, where the publication of the alleged
the law of a foreign state, the reference has generally been taken to be the internal law of that
foreign state and not to its conflict of laws rules." Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 12 (2d ed., 1938).
34 The true renvoi situation only arises when the law of another state or country is directly
referred to by the choice of law rules of the forum. Where the parties stipulate a law, it is al-
ways possible, of course, that they actually mean the whole law, including the conflict of
laws rules.
x Hartmann v. Time, Inc., i66 F. 2d 127 (C.C.A. 3d, 1948), cert. den. 68 S. Ct. 1495 (1948).
The defense of res judicata was also raised. This question was remanded to determine whether
or not plaintiff's unsuccessful suit in Massachusetts was actually decided on the merits.
2 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp., 1947) tit. 12, s. 39.
3 "Publication" as used in libel cases is a term of art referring to the communication of de-
famatory matter to one other than the person defamed. See Rest., Torts § 577 (1938).
4 The court relied on Bausewine v. Norristown, 351 Pa. 634, 641, 41 A. 2d 736, 740 (1945);
Sarkees v. Warner-West Corp., 349 Pa. 365,37 A. 2d 544 (x944); Summit Hotel Co. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, i96, 8 A. 2d 302, 309 (1939). The leading cases supporting this
doctrine are Age-Herald Pub. Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 4o, 92 So. 193 (1922); Wolfson v.
Syracuse Newspapers, 254 App. Div. 211, 4 N.Y.S. 2d 640 (1938); Forman v. Mississippi Pub-
lishers Corp., i95 Miss. 9o, 14 So. 2d 344 (1943); see also 148 A.L.R. 469 (I944); 37 A.L.R.
898 (1925).
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libel to some third person presumably first took place.5 It therefore held that
the "Illinois" cause of action "engrossed" the injury done in all the states fol-
lowing the "single publication" rule6 and was barred by the Illinois statute of
limitations.7 Any suit in Pennsylvania on the "Illinois" cause of action was
therefore barred.
The court added, however, that many states still adhere to the traditional
notion that "each time a libelous article is brought to the attention of a third
person, a new publication has occurred; that each publication is a separate and
actionable tort," and that Pennsylvania courts would "refer the respective
foreign publications to the appropriate foreign laws."" On this basis the court
held that later miscellaneous replacement copies of the same issue each consti-
tuted a new cause of action in those states which did not follow the "single pub-
lication" rule.9 Causes of action which were not barred by the statutes of limita-
tion in such states were held not barred by Pennsylvania law, so that each could
be sued upon in Pennsylvania.
The confused result reached by the Court of Appeals was due to a curious
application of the Pennsylvania choice of law rule,"' which provides that "the
law of the place or places, if any, where the cause or causes of action accrued
governs in the creation of substantive rights."' " Since the terms in a choice of
law rule are necessarily defined by reference to the internal law of the forum,12
the court employed Pennsylvania law to conclude that there could be but one
cause of action. Under Pennsylvania law, the law which is applicable to an
alleged multi-state libel is evidently the law of the "place of first impact," and
inasmuch as the allegedly libelous material was first communicated to the public
in Illinois, the law of that state was applied.3 Had the court stopped here, the
5 Life magazine is edited in New York City but is printed in Chicago and Philadelphia.
Distribution to subscribers begins from Chicago and copies of each issue first appear on the
news-stands in that city.
6Hartmann v. Time, Inc., i66 F. 2d 127, '34-35 (C.C.A. 3d, 1948), cert. den. 68 S. Ct.
1495 (1948).
"Actions for slander or libel shall be commenced within one year next after the cause of
action accrued." ill. Rev. Stat. (i947) c. 83, § 14.
8 Hartmann v. Time, Inc., i66 F. 2d i27, '34-35 (C.C.A. 3d, 1948), cert. den. 68 S. Ct.
1495 (1948).
9 For a formal statement of what may be termed the "multiple publication" rule see Rest.,
Torts § 578, Comment b (1938).
10 A federal court must look to the conflict of laws rule of the state in which the suit was
brought. Klaxon v. Stentor, 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
11 Hartmann v. Time, Inc., i66 F. 2d 127, 133 (C.C.A. 3d, 1948), cert. den. 68 S. Ct. 1495
(1948).
Z12 Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws 9i (1947). " ... it would seem to be clear that the con-
necting factor specified in a conflict rule of the forum must be defined by the lex fori." But
see Hancock, Torts in the Conflict of Laws i8g-gi (1942).
13 The court assumed that Illinois law applied to the "single" cause of action, without
expressly stating that it was looking to the law of the place of first impact.
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result would have been logically coherent. However, the court was impressed
by the fact that states not adhering to the "single publication" rule would per-
mit causes of action where their statutes of limitation had not run.' 4 To say, as
the court did, that the plaintiff could sue in Pennsylvania on causes of action
"arising" in those states completely contradicted the major premise that Penn-
sylvania law characterizes a multi-state libel as giving rise to only one cause of
action.
Although the court seemingly erred's in looking in part to foreign law in order
to interpret the terms in the Pennsylvania choice of law rule, it nevertheless is
one of the few courts to face squarely the intricate choice of law problem in libel
cases having multi-state contacts. 6 Thus, the case presents an opportunity to
examine the criteria which a court may utilize in formulating its choice of law
rule.
Traditional notions of the proper basis upon which to determine the place of
wrong in tort cases having multi-state contacts seem to have evolved from the
typical personal injury situations.17 In those cases the harm inflicted is usually
sufficiently limited in space and time to simplify the choice of law problem.' 8
But such unity of harm is not characteristic of a libel having multi-state con-
tacts. In a sense an "impact" on the person libeled results each and every time
the defamatory article is communicated to a third person. Where the circulation
involves many states, the "place of harm" test leads, by logical implication, to
the conclusion that at least one cause of action "arose" in each jurisdiction in
which the libelous article has been circulated and read; moreover, the plaintiff
may be able to sue the publisher in each jurisdiction as many times as the
defamatory material was communicated to third persons there.' 9
'4 In such states, since each publication constitutes a new tort, the local statutes of limita-
tion would seem to afford no practical protection to the defendant against stale claims. See 94
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 335 (1946), noting Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 67, (Pa., 1946).
i5 Perhaps the court was really not sure that Pennsylvania followed the "single publica-
tion" rule. The Pennsylvania cases cited in note 4 supra did not involve choice of law problems,
nor is it clear that they enunciated the idea that a widely 'circulated libel is but one cause of
action. Moreover, the relatively new idea that there is one integrated publication instead of
many publications constituting many torts has been principally used for purposes of applying
local venue and limitations statutes. No case cited by the court used this concept in a choice
of law situation to limit the number of different "foreign" causes of action the plaintiff might
have. These considerations may have led the court to its odd result, for it really had no square
precedent for applying the "single publication" notion to a choice of law problem.
'6 Hancock, Torts in the Conflict of Laws 252 (1942).
r7 See Alabama G.S.R.R. v. Carrol, 97 Ala. 126, ii So. 8o 3 (1892).
18 Where the physical impact occurs in more than one state, it has been held that the law
of each state will be applied to the damage resulting there. Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v.
Maine Central R.R., 78 N.H. 553, io3 Atl. 263 (i918).
9 O'Reilly v. Curtis Publishing Co., 31 F. Supp. 364 (Mass., 194o), seems to be the only
libel case which has squarely held that a separate cause of action exists in each jurisdiction in
which there was a publication. That there could be more than one cause of action within each
state was apparently not argued.
RECENT CASES
The objections to any such result are manifest. The plaintiff can harass the
defendant with a multitude of suits in different states even though the conduct
of the defendant amounts to only one integrated act. This possibility obviously
strengthens the bargaining position of those who bring libel actions solely for
extortionate purposes. The alternative possibility of incorporating all the vari-
ous causes of action in a single suit would necessarily involve instructing a jury
in the subtle distinctions existing in the substantive law of libel in each of forty-
eight or more systems of law-a preposterous result. Should suits actually be
brought in each jurisdiction, a defendant would be faced with the unfair pros-
pect of having general damages repeatedly assessed against him regardless of the
amount of actual injury to the plaintiff in each particular jurisdiction.20 If we
superimpose upon these difficulties the problem of adapting a nation-wide pub-
lication to the variance and uncertainty of libel law from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion, the resulting burden on freedom of expression becomes a strong argument
against adopting the traditional "place of impact" test.
One conceivable variation of the "place of impact" rule is the doctrine of
"place of first impact."2 1 In the case of a libel the place of "first impact" is pre-
sumably the jurisdiction in which the first unprivileged publication to a third
person takes place. Under this theory the first impact serves to "complete" the
cause of action, and all later publications in the same and other jurisdictions are
considered only in assessing damages. The merit of such a test is its simplicity
of application and its implicit recognition that the whole transaction results in
only one cause of action which the forum can deal with by referring to only one
system of law. But a rule necessitating stop-watch calculations to ascertain the
proper law is so divorced from the realities of the publishing business as to be of
dubious value. Indeed, if such a rule were generally adopted, publishers might
conveniently have the "first impact" take place in the jurisdiction having the
most lenient law of libel."
Another possible significant point of contact for determining the applicable
law is the domicil of the defamed person.23 Although the domicil has an impor-
tant interest in determining the scope of protection to be given the reputations
of its residents, the major limitation of this theory is the possibility that the
effects of the alleged libel may never be felt in the domicil. Furthermore, such
a test compels the publisher to formulate a standard of conduct which varies
with the domicil of the person alleging the defamation. And the basis for the
, Newell, Slander and Libel § 721 (1924). "General damages... arise by inference of
law and need not be proved by evidence."
21 Compare Banks v. King Features Syndicate, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 352 (N.Y., 1939). The
court, in a right of privacy suit having contacts with more than one state, applied the law of
state where "the seal of privacy was first broken."
-It would be a relatively inexpensive matter to start distribution in the most favorable
state.
23 Szalatnay-Stacho v. Fink, [1947] K.B. i. The case did not involve a widely circulated
publication. A letter was passed between two Czech officials in England libelling a third Czech
official in Egypt. The English court applied Czech law.
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doctrine breaks down completely in its application to purported defamations of
persons whose reputation is widespread24--the very persons to whom nationally
circulated periodicals give most attention.
Perhaps a more flexible solution, and one recognizing important contacts in
states outside the domicil, would be to adopt the law of the place where the
plaintiff has suffered the most harm.2s But here too the publisher is denied the
possibility of adequate prediction as to the scope of permissible conduct. In
addition, this test may involve nearly insoluble questions of fact.
Least unsatisfactory as a basis for liability is the law of the jurisdiction in
which the publisher has his principal place of business. 26 This test is easily ap-
plicable 7 and provides a fixed standard of conduct for the publisher. General
adoption of such a rule would eliminate the evils of shopping for a forum; the
publisher could not be harassed and coerced by multiple suits. The interests of
legitimate plaintiffs would not be prejudiced, since they could recover damages
for injury to reputation, wherever inflicted, in a single cause of action in any
convenient forum.2 Publishers might, of course, abuse the rule by concentrating
their principal places of business in states having lenient libel laws, but the pos-
sibility is at best a remote one.29 ;
The admixture of two mutually exclusive doctrines in the instant case illus-
trates the hopeless confusion presernt in multiple contact libel cases. Yet univer-
sal adoption of any of the suggested tests except the general "place of harm"
theory would improve the situation immeasurably. Thus, should all the states
adhere to the "principal place of publication" doctrine, apparently the only test
meriting general approval, the result would approach the ideal of federal legisla-
24 The Choice of Law in Multistate Defamation and Invasion of Privacy: An Unsolved
Problem, 6o Harv. L. Rev. 941, 948 (1947).
'S No court appears to have used such a test in a libel case having multi-state contacts. A
somewhat analogous conflicts test is used in multiple-contact contracts cases. See Jones v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., i58 N.Y. Misc. 466, 286 N.Y. Supp. 4 (1936).
26 United States v. Smith, 173 Fed. 227 (D.C. Ind., i909) (semble). One writer has sug-
gested applying the law of the place of broadcasting to widespread radio defamations. Han-
cock, Torts in the Conflict of Laws 253 (1942).
27 The location of the main editorial offices is most likely the best test for ascertaining the
principal place of business. In many cases editing and printing taking place in the same juris-
diction.
28 Damages would also have to be ascertained under the standards set by the internal
law of the jurisdiction in which the defendant does business. To say that after a libel has been
established under that law, damages must nevertheless be measured by the various standards
in other states, would be to undermine the administrative utility of considering the facts as
giving rise to but one cause of action.
Publishers may argue that under such a rule they may be liable for injury inflicted upon
the plaintiff in states which themselves would not consider the printed matter as libelous
under their internal law. The defendant may avoid this apparent unfairness by conforming to
the libel law of the state in which he does business.
29 Liability for libels is probably a calculated risk in the publishing business and considered
as a normal cost. It is doubtful that the economic impact of such a cost would induce a change
in the business site to avoid it.
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tion. But no potent force is operative to produce such a result, since state dif-
ferences in the statement or application of choice of law rules no longer create
constitutional questions.30 The absence of a judicially developed uniform test
and the unlikelihood of uniform state or federal legislations' point to continued
inadequate treatment of these choice of law problems-a result particularly
unfortunate because of the growth of mass communication.
DEBT COLLECTION BY BOYCOTT AS A "LABOR DISPUTE"
The respondent, a delicatessen proprietor, found that the delivery of bread
from Hinkle's Bakery at the noon hour was inconvenient and "required"
Hinkle's truck driver to deliver at another hour. After Hinkle's Bakery in-
formed the respondent that it would no longer supply her, she was able to
arrange a satisfactory hour of delivery with another bakery. Three weeks later
the business agent of the union representing Hinkle's drivers appeared at the
delicatessen and demanded immediate payment of $150 purportedly due the
driver. He also demanded that the respondent stop selling a non-union made
item which she had been carrying, and stated that the union would prevent all
shipments of bakery, milk, and dairy products to her store from any source if
these demands were not satisfied. According to the respondent, she then discon-
tinued sale of the non-union made item and made payment of the amount re-
quested, by check, to the bakery. The check, which had been turned over to the
union business agent by the bakery, was returned with a letter saying that it
could not be accepted in settlement because "it was $12.22 short of the amount
which is owed to our member." The next day the respondent was informed by
her new supplier that no more deliveries could be made, since the union had
threatened to pull out all of its drivers if any more products were sold or de-
livered to the respondent. After a more extensive boycott had been established,
with pickets parading in front of the delicatessen store, a federal district court
granted the respondent's petition for an injunction pendente lite restraining
both boycotting and picketing by the union. Upon appeal of the single ques-
tion of whether the case involved a labor dispute under the terms of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the
lower court's decision that no labor dispute existed.' On certiorari, the Supreme
Court affirmed, three justices dissenting. Bakery Sales Drivers Local Union No.
33 V. Wagshal.2
The Supreme Court, in a brief opinion, examined the three incidents corn-
30 O'Meara, Constitutional Aspects of the Conflict of Laws: Recent Developments, 27
Minn. L. Rev. 5oo (I943).
31 The Choice of Law in Multistate Defamation and Invasion of Privacy: An Unsolved
Problem, 6o Harv. L. Rev. 941, 951 (1947).
z Bakery Sales Drivers Local Union No. 33 v. Wagshal, 16i F. 2d 38o (App. D.C., 1947).
2333 U.S. 437 (1948).
